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The Commission of the European Communities is pleased to launch 
this first issue of the Steel Industry Safety and Health Commission 
Information  Bulletin,  which  it  hopes  will  meet  with  a  favourable 
reception from all sectors of the industry. 
Since it was set up  in  1965,  the Steel  Industry Safety and  Health 
Commission, whose task is to organize exchanges of experience in 
the field of occupational safety and health, has attempted, through 
the medium of meetings of experts from all the Member States of 
the Community, to collect information on the problems it has elec-
ted to deal with, to give these experts the opportunity for exchanges 
of experience and to draw up recommendations which may be regar-
ded as constituting codes of good practice. A list of these recom-
mendations can be found in this issue. 
The publication of this bulletin is a necessary step towards ensuring 
the dissemination of studies, of the results of research projects and 
of work carried out by the SISHC or with financial assistance from 
the ECSC. 
This  bulletin  is  in  particular  intended  to  promote  exchanges  of 
views  on  health,  safety  and  working  conditions  by  including  ac-
counts of accidents which have occurred in the Community iron and 
steel industry, by disseminating the conclusions reached in studies 
or arrived at through work in steel firms themselves and lastly byes-
tablishing  a  dialogue  between  steelmakers  from  Member  States 
with exchanges of the solutions they have  found  to shared  prob-
lems. 
This bulletin will only succeed in being a real medium for mutual ex-
change and in truly existing if large numbers of its readers contri-
bute to it, provide information and show their interest by answering 
the questions put in readers' letters. 
The  Commission  of  the  European  Communtties,  its  Directorate-
General for Employment, Social Affairs and Education and the Steel 
Industry Safety and  Health Commission take pleasure in  sending 
you this first issue of the Steel Industry Safety and Health Commis-
sion's Information Bulletin. 
Should you wish to receive forthcoming issues, please read 
carefully the 'Very important' notice on the bulletin's insert 
and take the necessary steps to ensure that the reply card 
is correctly returned. Accidents 
Gas 
Four workers were asphyxiated when entering a 
steel converter tilting pressure accumulator. Ow-
ing  to a connection error,  nitrogen was  used  in 
the ventilation system instead of compressed air. 
As  part  of the  statutory inspection of pressure 
vessels, an undertaking was engaged to paint the 
inside of a metal reservoir normally filled in  ser-
vice  with  water (to  provide  pressure  for  tilting 
steel converters) and compressed air at 60  bars. 
The foreman went into the vessel without abiding 
by the provisions laid down during the preparato-
ry  meeting  held  the  day  before,  whereby  there 
was  to  be  a  briefing  by  the  supervisor  before 
work  began  to  ensure  the  application  of  the 
following measures: 
- monitoring of atmosphere; 
- the painters to enter the vessel one at a time, 
wearing a lifeline and  a safety harness to al-
low them to be  lifted out if necessary, under 
the surveillance of two persons; 
- compressed-air respirators to be worn; 
- compressed-air  ventilation  beforehand,  and 
use of an extractor fan; 
- 24-volt lighting; 
- no smoking to be allowed. 
Owing to a connection error,  nitrogen was used 
in  the ventilation system instead of compressed 
air. Since the safety measures laid down had not 
been implemented, the foreman was asphyxiated 
as  were the three men  who went down into the 
vessel to help him. 
Action planned: 
- better kgowledge of the plant; 
- review  of  all  flow  systems  and  marking  of 
connections; 
-insistence  on  the  need  for  undertakings  to 
respect rules decided at preparatory meetings. 
Oxygen 
A technician was burned during repressurization 
of an oxygen system. 
A 250 mm diameter pipe, operated at a maximum 
pressure of 40 bars, links the oxygen plant to the 
works. The network may be cut off with a shut-off 
ball valve.  Downstream of this valve is the pres-
sure reduction and  distribution substation com-
prising three 150  m
3  containers, also at a maxi-
mum  in-service  pressure  of 40  bars.  This  pres-
sure-reduction station serves the melting shops 
and blast-furnaces via pipes of various diameters 
at in-service pressures ranging from 9 to 16 bars. 
The  three  containers  serve  to  cushion  sudden 
variations in user service demands. 
In  August, these containers were depressurized, 
blanking plates were inserted and the plant pur-
ged  with compressed air,  so that an  inspection 
agency could carry out the statutory three-yearly 
inspection. 
Once the  inspection was completed, the  blank-
ing plates were removed, the pipes were connec-
ted  and  the  inspection  holes at the  top  of the 
three containers were closed once again. An  ini-
tial check to see that the containers were sealed 
was carried out with oil-free compressed air, un-
der low pressure. Once these preliminary opera-
tions  had  been  completed,  a  technician  was 
given the task of repressurizing the system with 
oxygen. 
To carry out this operation, the shut-off ball valve 
was  fitted  with  a  20  mm  diameter copper and 
bronze by-pass fitted with a cock. By opening the 
cock,  the  pressure  upstream  and  downstream 
can  be  equalized  at a  reduced  flow  before  the 
main valve is opened. The by-pass was opened at 
about 14h15. It was decided that when a pressure 
of 10  bars was reached  in the containers, a full 
check would  be  carried out on  the seals,  espe-
cially on  the  inspection holes at the top of the 
three containers, using soapy water. 
At  about  15h55  the  pressure  gauge  showed  a 
pressure of 8 bars at the entry to the containers 
and the planned check was undertaken. Sudden-
ly a sheet of flame fed  by a large outflow of oxy-
gen shot out around the valve,  producing consi-
derable quantities of iron-oxide smoke and !Wat-
tering molten metal. The pipe downstream of the 
valve,  the valve  itself and  pipe  sections  in  the 
flame path were burned. The technician, who was 
close to the valve, was seriously burned and died. 
After  the  accident,  it  was  discovered  that  the 
shut-off ball valve was half open. 
Blast-furnaces 
Five  workers  were  injured  by  splashes  of  hot 
metal  when  a  skimmer dam  gave  way (by-pass 
tapping). 
After a shut-down for major maintenance work, a 
blast-furnace  was  started  up  on  a Saturday,  at 
about 12h30. 
3 On  the  Sunday,  casting  was  to  be  carried  out 
about midnight. A temporary skimmer had been 
drying since 21 h45.  At about 23h20  the tap-hole 
was  drilled  open.  The  furnace  keeper  used  an 
oxygen lance to complete the operation. 
At about 23h40 the hot metal was flowing slowly 
through the normal tap-hole. In 20 minutes or so, 
60  tonnes  were  poured  into ladles  through  the 
hot metal by-pass. There was a temporary device 
to  protect  the  normal  skimmer.  The  hot  metal 
flow rate  increased and the furnace men  stand-
ing along the main runner on the right threw sand 
along the sides to reinforce them. The  level gra-
dually rose in the runner and the flow rate increa-
sed  even  more.  The  foreman  decided  to  check 
the blast-furnace. It was 23h55. 
Suddenly the top of the temporary skimmer dam 
on  the slag side split under the pressure of the 
hot metal and gave way. There was an explosion 
in  the skimmer area,  which spattered hot metal 
around,  in  particular on  the  furnace  men  who 
were taking action in the vicinity of the sand pile 
beside the skimmer. 
The  hot metal flowed  rapidly down the slag by-
pass  runner  and  reached  the  'hot  metal  trap', 
causing a series of spattering explosions for two 
or three minutes. 
Molten matter hit five men in various parts of the 
body. The most seriously injured man had been 
running away from the danger area when he slip-
ped  crossing a runner and fell into it in  a sitting 
position. Despite the fact that a furnace man who 
happened to be  nearby acted quickly in  order to 
extricate him,  he  was  burnt on  the posterior by 
flowing  pig  iron.  The  other four  men  who  had 
been  injured  to  varying  degrees  managed  to 
escape  the  danger area  and  were  assisted  by 
fellow workers nearby. The foreman had the tap-
hole  closed  and  called  for  help.  (The  most 
seriously  injured  worker  died  two  and  a  half 
months later.) 
- The prompt action of the workers on the spot 
in  providing  help,  and  the  special  fire  extin-
guishers  (for  use  on  personnel)  and  sterile 
cloth used helped to limit the seriousness of 
the burns sustained. 
-The fireproof clothing worn at all times during 
work  (acquired  recently)  did  not  catch  fire. 
Holes were  made in  it when  it was struck by 
molten matter and the trouser legs were espe-
·cially damaged in spite of the double layer of 
cloth. 
-The aluminium coating on an  aluminized jac-
ket  worn  by  one  of the  men  was  volatilized 
along  the  lower back,  but. the  material  with· 
stood the heat and did not catch fire, even at 
the shoulders. It was, however, holed in places 
by drops of molten matter. 
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Variations  in  the  rate  of metal  flow from  blast-
furnaces may occur at any time. 
- High flow rates should be contained by suffi-
ciently  high  and  thick  runner  sides,  so  that 
men do not have to intervene in  the high-risk 
area during this part of the operation. A study 
committee  including  members of the  Safety 
and  Health  Commission  and  the  Working 
Group on  Hygiene and Safety at Work- Work-
ing  Conditions,  will  be  set  up  to  assist  in 
directing  research  already  in  progress  on 
appropriate technologies. 
- In  view  of the  potenial  performance  of  new 
and  recently-developed  clay  guns,  recom-
mendations  will  be  given  that  no  action 
should be taken if the flow rate rises very con-
siderably  or an  incident occurs.  If  checking 
the  blast-furnace does  not prove  sufficiently 
effective, the tap-hole must be closed. 
Instructions regarding the operation of tempora-
ry  skimmers will explain the change in operating 
procedures. 
- Consideration will be given to the purchase of 
aluminized asbestos leggings which are more 
comfortable than those previously tested. 
Killed by falling billet 3/80 
Two billet trimmers were checking and trimming 
60 mm square section billets, each approximate-
ly 8 metres long. The layout of the trimming sec-
tion is such that the trimmed, usable billets can 
be  tipped directly from the trimming station into 
the adjacent collecting pocket-whereas discar-
ded scrap billets have to be removed to the scrap 
pocket  by  crane.  During  this  process,  the  two 
trimmers carry out the slinging work themselves. 
When  the two trimmers had  deposited  a  scrap 
billet in  the scrap pocket they pulled the chains 
hanging from the cross beam over the front of the 
billet, as  usual and threw them on  to the billets 
lying  in  the  scrap  pocket.  They  then  gave  the 
crane driver the signal to raise  the cross beam 
and  returned to the trimming station to resume 
work there.  When  the cross beam  was  lifted, a 
chain sling caught the end of a deposited billet 
and  raised  it,  without this being  noticed. When 
the crane driver had raised the cross beam to the 
normal height, he drove the trolley to the normal 
waiting  position  above  the  billet  trimming  sta-
tion. The billet which had been raised accidental-
ly then slipped out of the chain and fell against 
the neck of one of the trimmers. The blow was so 
violent that the man died instantly (Fig. 1). Figure 1. 
The  accident  could  have  been  avoided  if  the 
crane driver and billet trimmers had kept their at-
tention on the cross beam and its chain sling un-
til the chains hung freely above the scrap pocket. 
Dragged along by a piece 
of scrap 4/81 
In  a rolling mill, the crop ends of the rolled bars 
are cut off by shears and fall into a scrap box un-
der the latter. During a night shift, a sheared crop 
end  was not conveyed by the rollers because it 
had  become jammed. Two men  pulled  the crop 
end, weighing about 35 kg, away from the shear-
ing  section  with  hooks and  left  it  lying  on  the 
steel  plate floor in  front of the  shears.  A  third 
shears  operator,  who  had  just  completed  his 
break, took a pair of tongs, lifted the hot piece of 
scrap and swung it into the scrap box containing 
red  hot scrap, which lies at a lower level behind 
the  shears.  In  the  process,  he  lost his balance 
and fell between the shears and railing, into the 
box.  He  suffered serious injuries from  which he 
later died in hospital. 
This serious accident was able to occur because 
the existing plant was considered adequate, al-
though it incorporated defects. The safety of the 
railing has since been  improved and a chute in-
stalled to prevent the crop ends from becoming 
blocked or otherwise hindered during transport. 
Struck by tubes from 
an overturned truck 5/80 
A  two-wheel  tube  truck  was  loaded  with  three 
tube  racks  and  pushed  through  the  production 
shop  by  four  workers.  The  total  weight  of  the 
truck was about 5.7 t. When one of its two wheels 
ran over a cast iron floor plate (600 x 400;  23 mm 
thick), the latter broke and the truck tipped over. 
Three  workers  managed  to  get  to  safety;  the 
fourth however, was knocked down by the falling 
tubes and suffered serious internal injuries. 
An examination of the broken floor plate showed 
that it was simply a case of forced rupture.  No 
previous damage could be found in the structure 
of the cast iron. The  rupture evidently occurred 
as a result of overloading. This accident illustrat-
es  that floor covers should be  checked for their 
carrying capacity, especially if located in traffic 
or work zones, and can be driven over by vehicles. 
In  the case in question, the method of transport-
ing tubes was also changed. 
Accident caused by an incorrect 
screw fitting on a portable 
fire extinguisher 4/80 
In  one of our associated works, a casting opera-
ter  tried  to  extinguish  burning  hydraulic  pipes 
next to the casting tower of a continuous casting 
installation with PG 6 portable powder extinguis-
hers. When the first extinguisher was empty, the 
fire continued to burn and he  was handed a se-
cond extinguisher of the same type. He removed 
the lead seal and pulled the locking pin, but when 
the  propellant  gas  flowed  into  the  pressure 
vessel, the fittings on the container were blown 
off  and wrenched out of his hand. The man suffered 
a fracture of the radius of the left forearm and fa-
cial  injuries. During  the accident enquiry it was 
established that the screw-on cap connecting the 
fittings to the pressure vessel had been  held by 
only one or two threads. It could not be  determi-
ned whether the cap had been screwed on to the 
container incorrectly after the  extinguisher had 
been  filled or whether it had  been  manipulated 
afterwards in the works, because the cap can be 
removed without damaging the lead seal. 
This accident demonstrates the need  to ensure 
that the fittings of portable fire extinguishers in 
working  areas  are  screwed  on  to  the  pressure 
vessel properly when they are checked. It would 
be useful if such fire extinguishers could not be 
unscrewed without breaking the lead seal. 
Fatally injured in a collision 
on a factory road 1/81 
A foreman in a sheet metal processing plant was 
transporting a pile of sheet metal from the mate-
rials  store to a  production shop with a  fork lift 
truck. On  the direct route to the store a factory 
5 road  had  to be  crossed  (Fig.  2).  Since  finished 
products  packed  in  cases  had  been  deposited 
between  the  production shop and  the  road,  the 
foreman could not see into the road. A lorry driver 
who was driving along the road at the same time 
could not see if any traffic was coming from the 
right. When the two drivers arrived at the junction, 
they recognized  the danger and braked sharply. 
However, they were unable to stop their vehicles 
quickly enough  and  the  foreman  drove  into the 
lorry at the level of the driver's cab with the fork 
lift truck.  He  was thrown off the  truck and  run 
over by the lorry's double rear wheel. He  died of 
his severe injuries at the scene of the accident. 
This accident illustrates the need to ensure that 
visibility  at  road/road  or  road/rail  junctions  on 
factory premises  is  not restricted  by  deposited 
cases  or  stored  material.  Such  areas  must  be 
kept  clear;  if  necessary,  by  the  installation  of 
structures  to  prevent  storage.  If,  for other  rea-
sons, it is not possible to keep the view unrestric-
ted,  e.g.  in  narrow  thoroughfares  between  two 
factory shops, mirrors must be set up to improve 
visibility or traffic signs installed, e.g. stop signs 
or warning lights, to draw attention to the danger. 
Vehicle drivers must drive no faster than walking 
pace in these areas and must stop their vehicles, 
if necessary,  in  order to exclude any danger in 
driving over the junction. 
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""'  Figure 2.  Diagram of the accident situation 
Gebaude =  building 
Borohaus =  administrative building 
Abstellplatz =  storage area 
Fahrtrichtung des Vorderstaplers = direction of 
travel of fork lift truck 
Vorderstapler =  fork lift truck 
Lastzug  =  lorry 
Fertigprodukte = finished products 
Kistenstapel = pile of cases 
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Fahrtrichtung des Lastzuges = direction of tra-
vel of lorry 
Angenommene Fahrtrichtung des Vorderstaplers 
= assumed direction of travel of fork lift truck 
Fatally injured while re-railing 
a wagon 4/81 
A shunter noticed that the shuttle car in a group 
of three wagons (two platform wagons, each car-
rying two slag bins and the shuttle car) was derai-
led. 
In order tore-rail it with the aid of a casting crane, 
the coupling between a platform wagon and the 
shuttle car which was  under tension, had  to be 
released. In order to slacken the coupling for the 
purpose  of  uncoupling  the  wagons,  a  vehicle 
which may be employed for pushing wagons was 
used. The vehicle pushed the group of wagons to-
gether according to the instructions of a shunter. 
During this process, the shunter passed between 
the wagons and  was crushed to death  because 
the buffers missed each other. 
In  this case,  the shunter should have  waited at 
a  safe  distance  for  the  wagons  to  be  pushed 
together before releasing the coupling. 
Hand amputated by 
a circular metal saw 
In  an  ingot finishing shop, a test sample was to 
be sawn off a rolled bar (measuring 150 x 150 mm) 
by  means of a circular saw (blade diameter: 600 
mm, peripheral speed: 10m/min). 
After clamping  the  bar,  the  operator,  who  had 
many years of experience in this work, tried to di-
rect the cooling water pipe,  which was close to 
the  saw  blade,  on  to  the  cutting  position.  His 
glove was caught and  his hand  pulled  between 
the  pipe fixture and  the saw blade,  resulting  in 
the amputation of half of the hand. 
The accident would not have occurred if the ope-
rator had not switched on the machine at the pre-
paratory  stage,  when  he  was clamping  the  bar 
and adjusting the cooling water pipe. The man's 
gloves increased the risk. 
The  place  where  the  hand  was  drawn  in  was 
made safe by the installation of a guard. In addi-
tion, all employees working in that area received 
fresh instructions. 
Open coil annealing bay 
At  the  beginning of the  annealing  process,  the 
coils arrive in the bay wound compactly. They are then  unwound  and  rewound  to  leave  a  regular 
space between the windings. During this opera-
tion, the strip passes between two vertical pull-
ing rolls which must be  cleaned several times a 
day  by  spraying  with  methylene  chloride.  The 
operator performs the cleaning operation with a 
pneumatic spray gun  while standing about one 
metre from the rolls. 
The operator had  set the rolls to move slowly in 
the  'inward' direction in  relation  to  his working 
position. For reasons which have not been estab-
lished, he was pulled in between the two rolls. He 
died on his way to hospital. 
In  future, the rolls will be  sprayed automatically 
by  vertical  spray  manifolds  fed  directly  under 
pressure. 
LD melting shop -
Ingot mould assembly area 
The casting bogies on which the bases support-
ing  the  ingot  moulds  are  placed  are  brought 
alongside an assembly platform. There, the ingot 
moulds  are  removed  by  an  overhead  travelling 
crane, the bogies are cleaned and a small plate is 
placed on  each bottom plate at the point of im-
pact of the liquid steel. The latter operations are 
performed by an operative who is normally in the 
last section of the working area when the ingot 
moulds are  lowered back into position. He is as-
sisted in his work by a crane driver who removes 
and replaces the ingot moulds with a clamp. 
After checking that the operative on  the ground 
was  at  the  back end  of the  line  of bogies,  the 
crane driver began the task of removing the ingot 
moulds from the storage area in order to replace 
them  on  their bases.  Having  arrived  above  the 
bases, he started the lowering motion. At a given 
moment he  saw an  ingot mould turning. He  im-
mediately  tried,  unsuccessfully,  to  raise  the 
tongs  again  to  retrieve  the  ingot  mould.  The 
mould became detached from the tongs and fell. 
As it fell, the crane driver saw the operative, who 
had moved to the adjacent base. The ingot mould 
fell over towards the victim, striking him on  the 
hght hip. 
- Operatives  working  on  the  ground  will  be 
equipped henceforth with a fluorescent yellow 
helmet and an orange jacket. 
- The  instructions  for  the  placing  of  ingot 
moulds on their bases have been revised. 
Steelworks · converter 
Following  a  water  leak  through  a  crack  in  the 
hood of the converter, the foreman found that the 
fumes emitted  by the  converter contained  15% 
hydrogen. 
He therefore decided to empty the converter en-
tirely  so  that  the  fume  collection  installation 
could be attended to by the maintenance depart-
ment. In  order to do this, the tank supplying the 
water circulating pumps had to be  emptied, and 
afterwards,  the  hood  containing  approximately 
10m3 of water had to be drained, allowing the wa-
ter to run  into the pit beneath the converter. At 
the same time, he instructed a bulldozer driver to 
clean out the pit. 
One hour after the converter had been  stopped, 
the bulldozer driver began to clean out the pit un-
der the converter, although it still contained wa-
ter.  In  the course of this operation, a violent ex-
plosion occurred as a result of contact between 
water and  liquid slag. The driver suffered severe 
burns and died several days later. 
Preventive measures: 
-Whenever a technical  incident occurs which 
makes it necessary to drain installations, the 
pit beneath the converter will have to be clea-
ned before the fume collection installation is 
drained. 
- Development  of a  system  to drain  off water 
from the upper levels and the hood through an 
external duct. 
- Improvement of the pit's drainage system to 
allow it to cope  with  abnormal quantities of 
inflowing water. 
- If a quantity of water remains in the pit in spite 
of the above  precautions, it must be  drained 
by a pump before any other action is taken. 
7 Coloured identification markings 
for gas cylinders 
The  subject of safety markings at  the  place of 
work  has  been  discussed  on  numerous  occa-
sions  by  the  Steel  Industry  Safety  and  Health 
Commission, which called for discussion of fur-
ther  safety  questions.  Accordingly,  the  SISHC 
drawn attention to the sources of danger for wor-
kers  who  regularly  cross  a  frontier  and  for 
migrant workers arising from the different colou· 
red  markings used for compressed gas cylinders 
in the Community countries. 
In  this document, two sets of examples, will be 
presented taken at random and not weighted in 
respect of any particular hazard or country. 
Examples · set 1 
An Italian migrant worker, who is used to finding 
ammonia (NH3)  in  green  cylinders,  finds that in 
the Benelux countries and in the FR of Germany 
these cylinders contain pure nitrogen (N 2). In the 
United Kingdom green cylinders contain sulphur 
dioxide (S02) or  methyl chloride (CH 3CI).In add it  ion 
there is a yellow band round the upper shoulder of 
the cylinder warning  him that the so2  is poiso-
nous, or a red band in the same position warning 
him that CH 3CI  is flammable. In Luxembourg NH3 
is kept  in  cylinders with blue and  white bands, 
but in Belgium and the United Kingdom it is kept 
in black cylinders with blue and white lengthwise 
bands or red  and yellow bands round the upper 
shoulder. In Germany NH3 cylinders are grey. 
Examples • set 2 
In  France, the United Kingdom, Italy and the Ne-
therlands acetylene (C2H2)  is kept In brown cylin-
ders. In  Luxembourg the cylinders are black and 
in Germany they are yellow. In  the neighbouring 
countries yellow is used for argon (Ar) in  France, 
for carbon  dioxide (C02)  and  carbon  monoxide 
(CO)  in  Luxembourg,  and  for neon  (Ne)  in  Bel-
gium. In the United Kingdom yellow is the colour 
for chlorine (CI) inter italia. In  Luxembourg chlori-
ne  is  kept  in  cylinders  with  black  and  white 
bands and in Germany in grey cylinders. 
If the wrong gas is used because the colour code 
is misinterpreted, workers could be  poisoned or 
burned, uncontrollable chemical reactions could 
take  place  or at  best  problems  of  a  technical 
nature could arise. 
Letters from  readers 
As the editorial makes clear,  it is intended that 
this Bulletin should also create a flow of informa-
tion between all those who deal with safety, he· 
alth and working conditions in the Community's 
various steel companies. 
The success of the bulletin will largely depend on 
how frequent such exchanges of information be-
come. It should not just be written tor but also by 
its readers. 
With  this  in  mind,  the  readers'  letters  section 
aims to stimulate cooperation  between  readers 
by giving them all a chance to: 
(a) put a problem to other readers in order to ob-
tain information or solutions relating to a spe-
cific, real problem. To this end, readers should 
write to: 
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Secretariat of the SISH Commission 
Information Bulletin 
Commission of the European Communities 
BP 1907 
L · 2920 Luxembourg 
(b) submit a note or article describing a solution 
to a problem  in  the field of safety,  health or 
working conditions. 
Publication of the text will be free of charge. 
Answers from  readers may be  sent to the same 
address. The Secretariat will forward them to the 
reader who posed the problem as soon as possi-
ble. 
The  Editorial  Committee  will  judge  whether to 
publish  those  answers  which  have  a  general 
interest and will safeguard the anonymity of the 
author if so requested. 
Readers' letters 
Cleaning the bags of our filter plant raises a pol-
lution  problem,  since  in  the  final  phase  of the 
cleaning  operation  we  direct a  stream  of com-
pressed air onto the bags, which releases large 
clouds of dust to the atmosphere. 
Is there any other way of carrying out this opera-
tion? Communication  problems  in  noisy  wor· 
king  environments  where  various  types 
of protective equipment need to be worn 
In  certain  circumstances  technical  personnel 
have to work together without being able to see 
each other. In such cases good communications 
are essential. 
Attempts  are  being  made  to  develop  suitable 
means of communication for use in situations of 
this type where protective equipment also needs 
to be  worn (safety helmets, goggles, ear defen-
ders, respirators, etc.). 
One example is the overhaul of an end coiler in a 
hot-strip mill next to a working coiler with a noise 
level varying from 95 to 110 dB (A). 
Have  satisfactory solutions been  found  to this 
problem? 
Checklist for management 
It is often said that a company's accident record 
reflects its methods of operation. Another asser-
tion frequently heard these days is that manage-
ment is constantly concerned about working con-
ditions. 
Consider for a moment what answers would be 
given to the following questions: 
- Could a visitor unexpectedly use any toilet or 
shower which he found in your sector without 
causing you embarrassment? 
- Do  you  give,  or  have  you  endorsed,  orders 
which you would not carry out yourself? 
- Do  you  have  any sedentary workers on  your 
staff? If not, why not? 
- Do  you  consider  certain  jobs  to  be  more 
dangerous than others? 
- Are you 'afraid' of entering certain sectors? 
- Have you considered how you would organize 
your sector to ensure a more contented staff? 
- Do  you  think  production  would  decrease  if 
this were done? 
- Did you request the budgetary means to effect 
your improvements? 
- Have you  produced a job definition for each 
task? 
Have  you  had  experience  with  similar  check-
lists? If so, what were the results? 
Letters to the editor 
Improved working conditions lead to fewer acci-
dents. 
One of the main stress factors at work is noise. 
Numerous efforts have  led  to  improvements  in 
some  areas,  notably  finishing  bays  of  rolling 
mills. 
The  improvements are  often  a  result  of simple 
modifications, which could easily be carried out 
on similar plant elsewhere. 
If you have found a solution, let us know -others 
may be interested. 
The stacks of oxygen converter shops have to be 
visited  at  regular  intervals  for cleaning  and  in-
spection  purposes. This  inspection visit is  car-
ried out in a purpose-built cage which must also 
be capable of negotiating the elbow in the stack. 
If the inspection cage gets stuck, or if there is a 
breakdown in the cage drive or any other type of 
malfunction,  it  may  prove  necessary to  rescue 
the workers in the cage. 
What solutions have been found to this problem 
in other steelworks? 
The causes of very serious accidents 
During the period 1977-80 the Steel Industry Safe-
ty and Health Commission carried out a detailed 
survey into the causes of 670 very serious acci-
dents which had occurred in the Lorraine steel in-
dustry between  1970  and  1976  and  had  caused 
either death or at least 10% permanent disable-
ment. The survey showed that 12% of the acci-
dents had happened to workmen in  a job which 
they had been doing for less than six months. Of 
these accident victims, more had been  transfer-
red  from  a different job than were new employ-
ees. Eighteen percent of the accidents happened 
to employees  during their first year of doing a 
particular job, and over 30% happened in the first 
three years. This evident lack of experience in the 
job  shows  clearly  the  importance  of  practical 
training which is geared to the requirements of 
the job. It is as important for workmen who chan-
ge jobs in the same works as for newly-recruited 
workers. 
When the accidents happened a number of years 
ago, it is difficult to determine whether any oral 
or written instructions were given, but the survey 
indicated  that  in  25%  of the  cases no instruc-
tions had been formulated. In  50% of the cases 
instructions had  been  given,  but were disregar-
9 ded either by the victim or by a third party in half 
of these cases. This means that in half of the ca-
ses of very serious accidents work had been  un-
dertaken without instructions having been given 
or complied with. It is essential that there should 
be safety instructions for every job. They should 
be  clear, precise and  relevant, and  should be  in-
corporated into the instructions for doing the job. 
However,  it is not enough merely to draw up  in-
structions. They must be driven home and shown 
to be important. The workmen must be motivated 
to  follow them  and  a check should  be  kept  on 
this. 
The cause of half of these 670 very serious acci-
dents lay in  the equipment (plant,  machinery or 
tools), which was either in  poor condition (23%), 
not fitted with a safety device which could have 
prevented the accident (23%) or fitted with a sa-
fety device which was unsuitable or not functio-
ning  properly (5%).  This clearly shows the  part 
played by equipment in  causing very serious ac-
cidents. It should be studied in detail in the inter-
ests of better accident prevention. 
The above are just one or two of the conclusions 
of this study. A full report is at present being prin-
ted and a notice will appear in this bulletin when 
it is published. 
Safety aspects of rail transport in steelworks 
A working party of Assider (Associazione della si-
derurgia  italiana)  has  prepared  a  document on 
this subject. 
We  hereby publish integrally the part of this do-
cument which contains the practical recommen-
dations,  and  thank Assider for its kind  permis-
sion to do so. 
1.  Design engineering characteristics 
and the characteristics of rolling stock 
in the context of rail transport in steel· 
works 
Rail networks are always subject to variations as 
regards clearances because of injudicious posi-
tioning of materials and vehicles; interference on 
these  networks  is  common,  both  between  rail 
vehicles and  with road  vehicles at  junctions. In 
steelworks this situation  is exacerbated  by  the 
fact that the confined spaces involved are conge-
sted by rail and road traffic operating at the same 
time and place. In addition, during transfer of lad-
les,  slag pots, equipment and various materials, 
overhead cranes may interfere with the safe use 
of the tracks. 
In  new  installations  or  when  design  improve-
ments are being incorporated in existing plants, 
an  endeavour should be  made to minimize inter-
ference and introduce specific codes of practice. 
With this in mind: 
- routes and  halts for road  vehicles should be 
established in advance; 
- routes  for  overhead  loads  (e.g.  steel  ladles, 
slag  pots  etc.)  should  be  established  in 
advance; 
-minimum clearances over and above any stan-
dard gauge normally used should be observed 
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both  on  the  straight  and  on  bends;  double-
track lines should have  a minimum space of 
70 em between them; 
- minimum clearances of 70 em over and above 
the  standard  gauge  should  be  respected  on 
both sides of the track at the entrance point 
and  inside the shops; when  this is not possi-
ble,  specific  warning  and  safety  systems 
should be introduced; 
-provision should be  made for communication 
and  signalling installations governing access 
to shops by rail vehicles; this rule should also 
be extended to existing installations; 
-the erection  or  installation  of  load-bearing 
structures, access points to underground pre-
mises,  reladling  pits,  fluid-carrying  pipes, 
electricity lines, etc., should be avoided in the 
vicinity of railway lines carrying molten mate-
rial; where this is not possible, special protec-
tion systems should be used to avoid damage 
in  the  event  of  spillage  of  molten  material 
from the rail cars; 
- slopes should be  eliminated at all  halts and, 
whenever  technically  possible,  this  should 
also apply to through tracks; this rule should 
also be extended to existing installations; 
- barriers  should  be  placed opposite the exits 
from production areas and the access ramps 
to installations in  order to channel personnel 
in a path parallel to the railway line; the doors 
of these  production  areas  should  open  out-
wards  and  the  stairs  should  not  encroach 
upon  the  clearance  added  to  the  standard 
gauge. 
1.1  Access to rail vehicles. With the exception of 
ingot cars and the like, these vehicles should 
be fitted with an approved-type access ladder consisting of steps and not rungs, with a han-
drail on  either side; these ladders should be 
recessed into the vehicle so that the operator 
is always within the overall dimensions of the 
vehicle. The first step should be at a standard 
height in  relation to the rail surface for all ty-
pes  of vehicles  used  inside  a  given  works. 
There  should  be  a  minimum of two  ladders 
and, if there are only two, these should be pla-
ced diagonally at either end of the vehicle. In 
the case of vehicles used to carry molten ma-
terial (e. g. slag cars), there should be four lad-
ders  corresponding  to  the  above  specifica-
tion. The pair of ladders at either end should 
be  interlinked  by  a  gangway  appropriately 
shielded  against  splashing  of  molten  mate-
rial.  Buffer  wagons  in  particular  must  be 
equipped with ladders and gangways on  the 
driver's side only. 
1.2 Use  of special cars.  In  order to carry  liquid 
and/or special materials (e.  g.  molten metal), 
these cars must be  suitably proportioned so 
as  to  be  able  to  cope  with  the  particularly 
heavy duty common in  the steel sector; they 
should be of solid and simple design in order 
to facilitate use and maintenance. 
Their carrying  facility should  be  of a design 
which,  in  the context of low-speed  haulage, 
should  eliminate the  possibility of splashes 
and spillage. Any cars fitted with mechanical 
or  automatic  tipping  facilities  should  be 
equipped  with  failsafe  systems  to  prevent 
accidental tipping. 
1.3 Use  of cars with automatic couplings. Auto-
matic couplings and their installation on  the 
ends of cars should cater for technical requi-
rements originating in the mechanical and dy-
namic  stresses  encountered  during  coup-
ling/uncoupling and  push-pull  shunting ope-
rations and should be fitted with appropriate 
protection systems on the upper part in order 
to  prevent  jamming  or  coupling/uncoupling 
problems due to splashes of molten material. 
The  release control should be  positioned so 
that the shunter never has to enter the space 
between the car ends. In addition, it should be 
equipped with a suitable safety device in  or-
der  to  prevent  injury  to  the  shunter  in  the 
event of a sudden jerk in the primary linkage. 
It  is  to  be  hoped  that the  use  of automatic 
couplings will gradually be extended to all ty-
pes  of  cars  and  locomotives  operating  in 
steelworks, particularly for carrying hot mate-
rials. 
1.4 Use  of non-braking cars.  In  terms of weight 
and  braking  power  the  size  of  locomotives 
should be such that, in conjunction with low-
speed  operation  and  abiding  by  the general 
rules  governing  rail  traffic,  the  train  can  be 
halted  over  a  reasonably  short  distance.  If 
technical reasons make it impossible to elimi-
nate  slight  slopes  in  the  steel  production 
area, suitable devices should be fitted to non-
braking vehicles in order to be able to immobi-
lize them on the tracks. 
1.5 Buffer  wagons.  Locomotives  used  to  carry 
molten material must be equipped with buffer 
wagons to shield  them against heat  for the 
purposes  of  hauling  hot  loads  (e.g.  ingot 
cars). Locomotives are usually equipped with 
one  buffer  wagon  at  each  end  for  this 
purpose. 
By increasing the distance between the loco-
motive and the ingot cars,  the buffer wagon 
acts as  a heat shield for the locomotive and 
may,  in  conjunction with the locomotive, en-
hance the braking action on  the train if it is 
equipped with a braking system. 
2. Operational characteristics 
The  operational characteristics of rail  traffic in 
steelworks involve, in additon to the hazards ari-
sing from rail traffic as such, hazards due to the 
transport of molten material. 
This  necessitates  greater  driver  discipline,  be-
cause of the inherently higher risk involved in any 
manoeuvring error or any failure to abide by the 
rules.  The  foregoing  considerations  therefore 
amply justify the endeavour made by steel com-
panies to draw up rules, modelled on those adop-
ted by the FS,  1 for internal rail operations; these 
rules are supplemented by recommendations to 
be  followed  in  the  steel  production  areas.  The 
need therefore arises for a 'code of practice' and 
the following is proposed: 
A code of practice in this context should mean a 
set  of written  in-plant recommendations drawn 
up  beforehand jointly by employer and  employ-
ees with a view to: 
- bringing internal rail transport movements into 
line  with  the  other  activities  in  steelworks 
while observing  in  full  requirements  concer-
ning  operative  safety  and  the  safeguard  of 
plant and equipment; 
-supplementing  the  rules  and  recommenda-
tions laid down by the company on rail trans-
port. 
A code of practice requires: 
1. Clear  establishment  of  which  bodies  and 
which workers within the company are respon-
sible  for  the  implementation  of  the  various 
provisions embodied in this code; 
'FS =  Italian State railways. 
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cesses directly and/or indirectly to be covered 
by this code and the hazards involved; 
3. Identification of the general internal rail trans-
port regulations and arrangements to be stres-
sed in the code with a view to accident preven-
tion; 
4. Agreement between the various bodies respon-
sible  for the  practical  implementation  of the 
code and the operatives concerned; 
5.  Ensuring that the content is based on the pre-
ventive measures deduced from an analysis of 
the hazards; 
6. A description of the practical stages, setting 
out clearly the behavioural and procedural pat-
tern to be strictly adhered to in the interests of 
accident prevention; 
7. Instruction of all workers covered by the code 
of practice. 
The various codes of practice and  the works re-
gulations  governing  rail  transport  should  be 
supplemented  by  a  hierarchical  breakdown  of 
responsibility as regards the allocation of indivi-
dual duties within the company. 
As a steelwork can comprise the following: 
(a) · scrapyard, 
(b)- furnace charging bay, 
(c)- casting pits, 
(d)· ingot mould preparation, 
(e)- stripping bay, 
(f)- preparation of feeder heads, 
(g)- reladling pit, 
(h)- continuous casting facilities. 
These codes of practice, catering for the require-
ments mentioned earlier, (and essential as far as 
safety is concerned) must therefore take due ac-
count of the objective situations of individual in-
stallations  and  of  specific aspects  peculiar to 
certain sectors, e. g.: 
A • Scrapyard 
12 
A-1. The  material  (scrap,  sprue,  croppings, 
etc.) must never project beyond the sides 
of the car. 
A-2. The load must be properly balanced. 
A-3. The material to be  loaded must be depo-
sited  in  the  car and  not dropped  into it 
from a height. 
A-4. The  route  followed  by  overhead  loads 
must not be  an  obstacle to or lie above 
trains which are manoeuvring. 
A-5. The  routes  followed  by  overhead  loads 
must coincide as  little as  possible with 
the path of the tracks in order to minimize 
the presence of scrap between the rails. 
B - Furnace charging bay 
B-1. Slag pot cars 
- There must be  a maximum loading le-
vel  in  order to  prevent  spillage resul-
ting from braking or manoeuvring. 
-There must be no slag overhanging the 
sides or above the level of the top of 
the slag pot. 
C · Casting pits 
C-1. During  railway  manoeuvres,  overhead 
cranes should not operate on the length 
of  track  over  which  the  train  is  being 
made up or over which it sets off. 
C-2. When the 'teeming train'  1 sets off there 
should be  no steel skulls projecting bey-
ond the overall dimensions of the car and 
the track should first be cleared of mate-
rials of any kind. 
C-3.  In the event of accidental spillage of mol-
ten material on to the track, the pit opera-
tive must personally coordinate the train 
manoeuvres with the engine driver. 
C-4. In the event of accidental spillage of steel 
on the ground near a track on which a ma-
noeuvre is taking place, the pit operative 
must immediately notify the engine driver 
concerned. 
D- Preparation of ingot moulds 
D-1. When  the  train  is  made  up,  the  loads 
must be balanced. Any plates placed as a 
protection between the bottom plate and 
the ingot mould must not project beyond 
the  overall  dimensions  of  the  bottom 
plate. 
D-2. Overhead cranes must not operate where 
the trains are manoeuvring. 
E - Stripping bay 
E-1.  Ingots,  bottom  plates  and  ingot moulds 
must not be  dropped onto bogeys during 
stripping operations. 
E-2. Overhead cranes must never operate on a 
stretch  of  track  where  shunting  opera-
tions are taking place. 
E-3. When the stripping operations have been 
completed and  before the train  sets off, 
the stability and the balance of the  load 
must first be checked. 
'The expression 'teeming train' refers to a train loaded with Ingot moulds Into 
which steel has been poured. 3. Qualifications of workers 
and work organization 
In  relation  to other activities  in  the  works,  the 
procedural and behavioural aspects of rail trans-
port  hold  deep  implications  as  regards  safety 
and it is therefore essential to: 
·_train the personnel who, in addition to the spe-
cific knowledge relating to rail transport must 
have  a  working  knowledge  of  the  materials 
transported, the relevant technical characteri-
sties and  the  hazards  arising from  the  state 
and the temperature of these materials; 
- provide appropriate information to the operati-
ves as regards the specific technical features 
of railway and equipment; 
- ensure that operatives participate in  drawing 
up railway rules and codes of practice, which 
must be  supplemented by hierarchical break-
down of responsibilities as regards individual 
tasks and duties. 
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of the sources of such contamination. 
EUR 7197- EGKS-Rundtischgesprach ,Kokerei-
und Koksforschung" 
EUR  7197  - ECSC  round  table  meeting  'Coke 
oven and coke research' 
EUR  7197  - CECA table ronde ••Recherches sur 
cokeries et coken 
1981  - IX, 361  pp. 
DE/EN/FR/IT 
Price (excluding VAT) in  Luxembourg: 
ECU  18  BFR 750  DM 46  IRL 12.50 
UKL 9.80  USD 21.50 
This  publication contains the  papers  presented 
at  the  symposium  which  took  place  at  Luxem-
bourg on 6 and 7 October 1980, on the latest rese-
arch  projects  sponsored  by  the  European  Coal 
and  Steel  Community on  the  protection of the 
working  environment  in  coking  plants,  and  the 
production and use of coke. 
15 Very important 
This issue of the Information Bulletin is being sent to company and 
works  managements,  to medical  and  safety departments,  to  the 
chairmen  of  safety  committees  and  company  or  works  bodies 
(Betriebsrat, Consiglio di fabbrica, Comite ou Conseil d'entreprise) 
formed as a result of legislation and called upon to deal with the 
whole range of social problems arising within the Community iron 
and steel industry. 
Future issues will be  sent free not to the aforementioned persons 
but only to companies or works which have so  requested, so that 
bulk deliveries may be made. Interested parties in the same company 
or works are therefore asked to consult one together before filling out 
the reply card on the facing page and to indicate on it the number of 
copies (within reason, i.  e.  in order to meet a real  need) which the 
company or works would like to receive and the department (not the 
person) in the company or works whose task it is to disseminate and 
circulate the Information Bulletin to the interested parties. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
L·2985Luxembourg  Catalogue number: CD-35-82-376-EN-C 